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Abstract
At present, in the domain of simultaneous action selection and network
formation games, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are
not consistent. While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-
)co-ordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient
(non-Nash) strategy profiles. One reason for this discrepancy is the tendency
to model corresponding games as one-shot and derive predictions. In this
paper, we calculate the equilibria for a finitely repeated version of the Hawk-
Dove game with endogenous network formation and show that the repetition
leads to additional sub-game perfect equilibria; namely, the efficient strategy
profiles played by human subjects. However, efficiency crucially depends on
the design of the game. This paper theoretically demonstrates that, although
technically feasible, the efficient profiles are not sub-game perfect equilibria
if actions are fixed after an initial period. We confirm this result using an
experimental study that demonstrates how payoffs are higher if actions are
never fixed.
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1. Introduction
In Network Hawk-Dove games, players decide with whom to interact by
establishing links at a certain cost and play a Hawk-Dove game with all
linked players. Existing studies have calculated the equilibria of the one-shot
version of this game (Bramoulle´ et al., 2004; Berninghaus and Vogt, 2006)
and existing research indicates that subjects do not resort to these equilib-
ria (Berninghaus et al., 2012). This paper extends existing research in this
area in two directions: (1) We formally show that, although repeated play
typically tends to lead to more efficiency, in Network Hawk-Dove games, rep-
etition alone does not yield efficient outcomes. It is the order in which players
optimize their strategies; i.e., whether they form links or choose actions first
that allows them to play efficient strategy profiles. (2) By conducting an
experimental study, we demonstrate that subjects do, in fact, follow the the-
oretically predicted patterns.
Existing analyses on anti-coordination games, such as Hawk-Dove games
that incorporate endogenous network formation, are rather scarce. Bramoulle´
et al. (2004) revealed that one-shot networks in which all players myopically
maximize their payoffs against more aggressive players, i.e., hawks, than
against defensive players, i.e., doves, do exist. However, as the overall pay-
off in the network increases, the more aggressive players switch to defensive
strategies (Bramoulle´ et al., 2004; Berninghaus and Vogt, 2006). In behav-
ioral experiments on finitely repeated versions of the game, subjects tend to
choose hawk less often than the one-shot model predicts (Berninghaus et al.,
2012). If subjects are limited to bilateral links, they seem to favor fair out-
comes. That is, interactions only occur if both players agree on them. In cor-
responding experiments, subjects alternate between aggressive and defensive
behavior in each period to gain equal payoffs for all participants (Tsvetkova
and Buskens, 2013). However, the discrepancy between theoretically pre-
dicted aggression and empirically observed defensive behavior has not yet
been resolved. Specifically, whether the high frequency of defensive behavior
in laboratory experiments is the result of repeated play or a deviation from
myopic payoff maximizing behavior remains unclear.
In this sense, research on coordination games, i.e. games in which both
players resort to the same strategy in equilibrium as a result of endogenous
network formation, is a step ahead. Here, players choose their action in a
2 × 2 coordination game and play this with all other players to whom they
are linked (Hojman and Szeidl, 2006). Unilateral linking leads to complete
2
networks in which all players resort to the same equilibrium of the one-shot
game; namely, the payoff-dominant or risk-dominant equilibrium (Goyal and
Vega-Redondo, 2005). This changes if bilateral linking is allowed; i.e., if both
players have to agree on the establishment of the link. At this point, different
network structures emerge and the strategies played depend on the network
structures generated; for example, in circles only risk dominant actions are
chosen, while in complete networks payoff and risk dominant equilibria are
possible (Jackson andWatts, 2002). Existing theoretic analyses confirms that
risk-dominant equilibria are more likely. In contrast, subjects in behavioral
experiments (Corten and Buskens, 2010; Corbae and Duffy, 2008) play the
payoff-dominant equilibrium more frequently. Hence, predictions for the one-
shot version of the game are in line with experimental observations.
Aside from the discussion on overall payoffs and myopically best behavior,
literature on coordination games exceeds the literature on anti-coordination
games in terms of dynamics. Theoretical analyses show that all players who
repeatedly play in a circle (Ellison, 1993; Jackson and Watts, 2000) or a lat-
tice (Blume, 1993; Kosfeld, 2002) converge to the risk dominant equilibrium.
In corresponding experiments (Berninghaus et al., 2002), subjects reach both
the risk-dominant and the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, the payoff-
dominant equilibrium is more likely if the underlying network is a circle.
The situation changes if players can choose both the network structure and
their actions. According to existing theoretical models, populations converge
towards the payoff-dominant equilibrium because players can remove their
links to players who resort to the inefficient strategy (Ely, 2002; Bhaskar and
Vega-Redondo, 2004). This result is in agreement with corresponding behav-
ioral experiments (Corten and Buskens, 2010; Corbae and Duffy, 2008). In
sum, existing literature indicates that the network structure influences the
behavior of subjects in experimental studies to the extent that, in contrast to
claims that repetition leads to efficiency, efficiency depends on the structure
and not (solely) on repetition. Hence, it is important that formal analy-
ses of networked (anti-)coordination games are conducted and compared to
experimental results.
This paper aims to extend existing literature that examines Hawk-Dove
games with endogenous network formation in both directions. First, we
analyze Hawk-Dove games with endogenous network formation, hereafter
called the Network Hawk-Dove game, as a finitely repeated, as opposed to
one-shot, game. We show that by applying simple trigger strategies, the
strategies we observe in our experiment are theoretically plausible. Second,
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we show that, by limiting the strategy set for some periods, the theoretical
predictions change. Namely, we introduce three treatments: (1) In Treatment
Basic, subjects are free to choose actions and links throughout the game; (2)
In Treatment Fixed Action, the actions chosen in the initial period are fixed
for the upcoming four periods; and (3) In Treatment Fixed Link, the links
chosen in the initial period are fixed for the next four periods. Although
identical outcomes are theoretically possible in all three treatments, i.e. in the
initial period in all treatments links and actions are not fixed, the theoretical
predictions differ. In Treatment Basic and Fixed Action efficient strategy
profiles are sub-game perfect equilibria, while in Treatment Fixed Link only
inefficient strategy profiles are sub-game perfect. We confirm this theoretical
prediction through the use of a behavioral experiment. In Treatment Basic
and Fixed Action, the behavior of subjects converges towards strategy profiles
that are more efficient than those employed in Treatment Fixed Link.
2. The Network Hawk-Dove game
Each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in a Network Hawk-Dove game participates in
a Hawk-Dove game with all players j she is linked to, using a Network game.
We first introduce the Hawk-Dove game and the Network game separately
before combining them into the Network Hawk-Dove game.
In the Network game GN := {ΣN ,ΠN(·)}, player i decides with whom
she wants to interact.1 Hence, each strategy in the Network game σNi is a
subset of all players σNi ⊆ ΣN \ {i} with ΣN := {1, . . . , n}. Establishing
links to other players is not without cost k > 0 for each established link. The
payoff of the Network game is ΠN(σNi , σ
N
−i) := −k ·|σNi |. Each strategy profile
σN = (σN1 , . . . , σ
N
n ) implies a directed graph g(σ
N) = (V (σN), E(σN)) with
edges E(σN) and vertices V (σN). Each vertex vi ∈ V (σN) that corresponds
to 1 player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For each link player i establishes to player j; i.e.,
if j ∈ σNi , an edge (i, j) from vertex vi to vj exists in E(σN). Each player
i has a set of contacts Ni(σ
N) := σNi ∪ {j|(j, i) ∈ E(σN)}, consisting of the
players to whom she establishes a link, σNi , and those who establish a link
to her, {j|(j, i) ∈ E(σN)}.
The Hawk-Dove game is a symmetric 2 × 2 normal form game GB :=
{ΣB,ΠB(·)}. Every player i in the Hawk-Dove game can choose between two
1We model the Network game as a non-cooperative game (Bala and Goyal, 2000).
4
strategies: hawk (H) and dove (D); i.e., ΣB := {H,D}. One can interpret
hawk as an aggressive strategy and dove as a defensive strategy. If two hawks
interact, their payoff is minimal. All other strategy profiles lead to pareto-
optimal outcomes (Berninghaus et al., 2012); however, only (H,D) and (D,H)
represent Nash equilibria. Table 1 summarizes the payoff matrix of ΠB(·).
Table 1: Payoff matrix Hawk-Dove game (with a > b > c > d > 0)
Hawk (H) Dove (D)
Hawk (H) d,d a,c
Dove (D) c,a b,b
The non-cooperative Network Hawk-Dove game Γ := {S;P} is a combi-
nation of the Hawk-Dove game GB and the Network game GN . Hereafter,
we refer to strategies in the Hawk-Dove game actions and strategies in the
Network game links to distinguish them from the strategies in the Network
Hawk-Dove game. In the Network Hawk-Dove game, each player i chooses
her action σBi and her links σ
N
i . Hence, the strategy set S := Σ
B×ΣN in the
Network Hawk-Dove game is a Cartesian product of the strategy sets in GB
and GN . Notice that, although each player i chooses whether to establish a
link to every other player j, she only chooses her action once. Each player
i pays for her links and participates in a Hawk-Dove game GB with every
linked player. Clearly, the payoff of player i using strategy si = (σ
B
i , σ
N
i ) ∈ S
depends on the number of contacts playing hawk niH(s) =
∑
j∈Ni(σN ) 1{σBj =H}
and dove niD(s) =
∑
j∈Ni(σN ) 1{σBj =D}. The number of contacts in the neigh-
borhood is ni(s) := niH(s) + n
i
D(s). Given the payoff function P : S → R,
the payoff of player i is:
Pi(s−i, {σBi = H; σNi }) := d · niH(s) + a · niD(s)− k |σNi |
Pi(s−i, {σBi = D; σNi }) := c · niH(s) + b · niD(s)− k |σNi |
Example 1. As a running example throughout the paper, we will employ
the parameters summarized in Table 2. Specifically, in a network of n = 6
players, establishing links costs k = 50. A hawk that is linked to another
hawk earns d = 20, while those linked to a dove earn a = 80. Doves earn
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b = 60 for links to other doves and c = 40 for links to hawks. We also use
these parameters in the behavioral experiment described in Section 5.1.
Table 2: Running example of Network Hawk-Dove game with k = 50 and n = 6
Hawk (H) Dove (D)
Hawk (H) d = 20, d = 20 a = 80, c = 40
Dove (D) c = 40, a = 80 b = 60, b = 60
In the remainder, we limit our analysis to (1) k ≥ 2d, (2) a > b > k >
c > d, (3) 2c > k and (4) n ≥ 3 (see the appendix for a justification).
3. Social dilemmas in one-shot Network Hawk-Dove games
Human interaction is often characterized by two goals: (1) myopic utility
maximization; i.e. the Nash criteria, and (2) overall utility maximization; i.e.
efficiency (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Social dilemmas occur if these two
goals differ. In the remainder of this section, we investigate whether social
dilemmas occur in the Network Hawk-Dove game. We focus on three aspects
of the game: a link-centric game, an action-centric game and the integrated
game representing the Network Hawk-Dove game.2
3.1. Link-centric game
We first assume that players can only choose with whom they interact,
while the actions of the players are given. To reach an efficient strategy
profile, all players have to establish links with the players that they benefit
from. As the cost k exceeds 2d but is lower than a and b, all unilateral links
increase the payoffs, with the exception of links between hawks.
Theorem 1 (Link efficiency). A strategy profile is efficient with respect to
links, i.e., it is link efficient, if all links are unilateral and, with the exception
of links between hawks, all links are established.
2In the remainder of the paper we present the intuition and the main results of our for-
mal analysis, while all formal proofs are part of our appendix. Each main result references
to the corresponding result and proof in the appendix.
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However, not all efficient links represent myopically best replies. Namely,
myopic players will drop any links that incur a higher cost than the benefit
attained. Namely, doves will remove all links to hawks (as k > c). Corre-
sponding links are then established by the involved hawks (as a > k).
Theorem 2 (Link balance). A strategy profile is in equilibrium with re-
spect to links, i.e., it is link balanced, if all links are link efficient and doves
only pay for links to other doves.
When comparing link efficient and link balanced strategy profiles, it be-
comes obvious that all link balanced strategy profiles are a subset of the link
efficient strategy profiles. In addition, the intuition behind all link balanced
strategy profiles clearly indicates that, for every link efficient strategy profile
that emerges, a link balanced strategy profile with identical overall payoffs
will exist. Hence, no social dilemma occurs in the Network game.
3.2. Action-centric game
The situation changes if we look at the played actions in a fixed network.
Here, starting from a network that consists of hawks alone, the overall payoff
increases the more hawks switch to dove; for both hawks and doves, the
payoff from being linked to another dove is higher than that achieved for
being linked to another hawk. However, no corresponding results can be
found for an upper bound of the number of doves3.
Theorem 3 (Action efficiency). A strategy profile with at least one link
is efficient with respect to actions, i.e., it is action efficient, if the number of
hawks n
′
H lies below a certain upper bound. For certain network structures,
no upper bound for the number of doves exists.
A myopic payoff-maximizing player will always choose the hawk action
if his payoff for playing hawk exceeds his payoff for playing the dove action.
As a consequence, for each neighborhood, choosing hawk is beneficial if the
fraction of players in the neighborhood playing hawks lies below a certain
threshold.
3This result is the most unspecific result throughout the paper. In the remainder, we
will describe action efficient strategy profiles for certain network structures more precisely.
However, we cannot find an overall simple result that captures all possible underlying
network structures.
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Theorem 4 (Action balance). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ (SB,ΣN) is in equi-
librium with respect to actions, i.e., is action balanced, if the following state-
ment holds: Each player i uses the hawk action if, in his neighborhood, the
following condition holds: niH(s
∗) < a−b
a−b+c−d · ni(s∗), with niH(s∗) (ni(s∗))
being the number of hawks (players) in her neighborhood. Otherwise, every
player resorts to dove.
Given a fixed network structure in an equilibrium, the number of doves
always has an upper limit. As soon as two doves are linked, one can increase
her payoff by switching to hawk, as the number of hawks in her neighborhood
is niH(s
∗) = 0 and, therefore, below a−b
a−b+c−d · ni(s∗). This is in contrast to
the efficient strategy profile in which no such upper limit exists. Hence, for
Hawk-Dove games in a fixed network, social dilemmas can occur.
Figure 1: Establishment of action balance
1: D
2: D
3: D
4: D
5: D
6: D
1: D
2: H
3: D
4: D
5: D
6: D
1: D
2: H
3: D
4: H
5: H
6: D
(a) Unbalanced network (b) Player 2 switches to hawk (c) Action balance
Example 2. Let us return to the running example. To establish action
balance, a player will switch to hawk if less than half the other players
in her neighborhood resort to hawk (due to niH(s
∗) < a−b
a−b+c−d · ni(s∗) =
80−60
80−60+20−20 ·ni(s∗) = 12 ·ni(s∗)). Think of a network in which all of the n = 6
players are interlinked with all other participants (see Figure 1 (a)). In equi-
librium, at least three players will resort to hawk if less than three hawks are
in the network; each dove has below 2
6
< 1
2
hawks in her neighborhood and
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will benefit from switching to hawk. However, the resulting network is not ef-
ficient (see Figure 1 (c)). The payoff of each dove player is 240 = 2·60+3·40
and the hawks receive 320 = 2 · 40 + 3 · 80 for their links, yielding an overall
payoff of 1680 = 3 · 240 + 3 · 320. If all players resort to dove, the payoff per
dove is 300 = 5 · 60 and the overall payoff is 1800 = 6 · 300 > 1680.
3.3. Integrated game
Let us now combine the action- and link-centric games to perform an
integrated analysis of the Network Hawk-Dove game. As we have seen, when
investigating the game with a focus on links only, links between hawks are not
established in efficient strategy profiles. Hence, the neighborhood of doves
consists of all other players, while the neighborhood of hawks consists of
doves alone. Using this intuition, one can easily calculate the efficient payoff
for a certain number of hawks and doves in the network. Maximizing this
payoff results in the optimal number of hawks for a network:
Theorem 5 (Efficient Network Hawk-Dove game). In efficient strat-
egy profiles of Network Hawk-Dove games, all links are link efficient and the
number of hawks n
′
H satisfies
n
′
H =
1
2
(n− b−0.5k
a+c−b−0.5k (n− 1)).
An analysis of the Nash equilibria in the Network Hawk-Dove game fol-
lows a similar intuition as the search for efficiency. Given a link balanced
network, whether a player can increase her payoff by deviating unilaterally
can be calculated for every hawk and every dove. A corresponding analysis
yields a lower bound for the number of hawks n∗H in the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6 (Equilibrium Network Hawk-Dove game). In Nash equi-
libria of Network Hawk-Dove games, all links are link balanced and the num-
ber of hawks n∗H satisfies
n∗H ≥ a−ba−b+c−d(n− 1) > 0.
Again social dilemmas occur. On the one hand, Nash equilibria exceed
the number of efficient strategy profiles, as Nash equilibria occur for a range
of different numbers of hawks, while only one optimal number of hawks exists.
On the other hand, the number of hawks in efficient strategy profiles might
be below the minimum number of hawks desired for a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Emergence of equilibrium
1: D
2: H
3: D
4: H
5: H
6: D
1: D
2: H
3: D
4: H
5: H
6: D
1: D
2: H
3: D
4: H
5: H
6: D
(a) Initial network (b) Without (hawk,hawk) links(c) Links to doves only
Example 3. Think of a network that consists of three hawks and three doves
(see Figure 2 (a)). To reach an equilibrium in a Network Hawk-Dove game,
the links between hawks are dropped (see Figure 2 (b)) all other links are
unilateral and always point to doves (see Figure 2 (c)). The overall payoff
in the population is now 240 = 2 · 60 + 3 · 40 for doves (Players 1, 3 and 6)
and 240 = 3 · 80 for hawks (Players 2, 4 and 5) yielding an overall payoff of
1440 = 3·240+3·240. To reach this payoff, all three hawks establish three links
(one per dove) and each dove establishes exactly one link to one other dove,
yielding costs of 600 = (3 · 3 + 3 · 1) · 50). Hence the benefit after subtracting
the cost is 840. However, by switching from hawk to dove and establishing
links to the remaining doves, (resulting in a network as in Figure 1 (a)) the
payoff could be increased. That is, in a system that consists of interlinked
doves alone, the benefit from participation per dove is 300 = 5 · 60, while
facing average costs of 125 = 2.5 · 50. Hence, the payoff per dove is 175 and,
for the whole population, 1050 = 6 · 175 > 840.
In other words, for the given set of parameters, Nash equilibria and effi-
cient strategy profiles differ, and this difference is not limited to our running
example. If a+c ≤ b+ 1
2
k, the number of hawks in an efficient strategy profile
is nH = 0 (see Theorem 5). This always differs from the equilibrium predic-
tion, which needs n∗H to be greater than 0 (see Theorem 6). If a+ c > b+
1
2
k,
the upper bound for the number of hawks is nH =
n
2
≥ 1
2
(n− b−0.5k
a+c−b−0.5k (n−1))
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in efficient strategy profiles, while the Nash equilibrium prescribes a lower
bound for the number of hawks. Hence, this also allows for several parameter
combinations in which social dilemmas occur.
4. Impact of finite repetition on social dilemmas
While we have shown that if players only choose links, all Nash equilibria
are efficient strategy profiles, we see that Nash equilibria and efficient strategy
profiles differ as soon as players can choose their actions. In the remainder
of this paper, we analyze whether playing the games repeatedly can help us
to align efficiency and Nash equilibria.
One trivial result from game theory is that finitely repeating a Nash
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in itself. However, repeatedly playing
the game, even for a finite number of periods, can help to reach additional
equilibria. An approach to play the efficient strategy for at least a couple
of periods represents trigger strategies. Here, the efficient strategy profile is
played in the first period. Playing this strategy profile is continued unless
one of the players deviates. The deviating player is then punished as all other
players resort to the Nash equilibrium, which yields the lowest payoff for the
deviator. If there is no deviation, all players switch to the Nash equilibrium
and this yields the highest overall payoff for the last {t∗ + 1, ..., T} periods
(Friedman, 1985; Benoit and Krishna, 1985). Solution 1 summarizes a trigger
strategy (Friedman, 1985; Benoit and Krishna, 1985) to establish efficient
strategy profiles that are no equilibria of the stage game.
Solution 1 (Trigger strategy for games with finite horizon). To estab-
lish a desired strategy profile in a finitely repeated game, the following trigger
strategy can be used:
a) In t = 1 play the efficient strategy profile.
b) In t ∈ {2, ..., t∗} keep playing the efficient strategy profile if no player
deviated. Otherwise, resort to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game,
yielding the lowest payoff for the deviator.
c) In t ∈ {t∗ + 1, ..., T} play the Nash equilibrium of the stage game,
yielding the highest overall payoff if no player deviated. Otherwise,
resort to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, yielding the lowest
payoff for the deviator.
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Using this trigger strategy results in an additional sub-game perfect equi-
libria, in which players resort to a strategy profile that yields higher payoffs
than the payoff maximal Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, providing
the following conditions for the game hold. First, players need to resort to a
Nash equilibrium in the terminal periods {t∗ + 1, ..., T}. Otherwise, at least
one player could deviate from the strategy profile played. Second, during the
terminal periods {t∗ +1, ..., T}, two Nash equilibria, one to punish deviators
and one to reward non-deviators, are required; otherwise, a player who de-
viated in period t∗ could not be punished in subsequent periods. Third, for
the punishment to be effective, the sum of payoffs in the Nash equilibrium
to reward, minus the payoffs in the Nash Equilibrium to punish in periods
{t∗ + 1, ..., T}, has to exceed the payoff gain for deviating from the desired
strategy in period t∗. Otherwise, a player would deviate in t∗. Note, this
condition is sufficient for periods {1, ..., t∗ − 1} to prevent any deviations be-
cause deviations in earlier periods would increase the number of periods other
players could use to punish and, hence, would not lead to a payoff increase.
As the described trigger strategy does not allow for beneficial deviations in
any period, the resulting Nash equilibrium is sub-game perfect.
4.1. Repeated Network Hawk-Dove game
Our analysis of the one-shot game shows that efficient strategy profiles
and Nash equilibria in the Network Hawk-Dove game differ in the number
of hawks in the network. Hence, (1) the efficient strategy profile played in
period t = 1 should ensure a certain number of hawks nH . All links should be
link balanced (see Theorem 2) to ensure that payoffs are equally distributed.
(2) The best punishment for deviations from the efficient strategy profile is
to play the Nash equilibrium (see Lemma 1), with nH = n hawks having
no links. This ensures that all payoffs are 0. (3) As the desired strategy
profile in periods 1 to t∗ is no equilibrium in the one-shot game, players
have an incentive to deviate. To overcome this, we choose to play the Nash
equilibrium of the one-shot game yielding the highest payoff during the last
periods. The following definition summarizes this trigger strategy:
Theorem 7 (Finitely repeated equilibrium). Let the following inequal-
ity hold: t∗ ≤ T − n
′
H ·(d−c)+(n−n
′
H−1)·(a−b)
min{n∗H ·c+(n−n∗H−1)(b−k);(n−n∗H−1)(a−k)} . To reach Nash equi-
libria that consists of efficient strategy profiles during the first periods, the
stage game in the T -period repeated Network Hawk-Dove game Γ, the players
have to resort to the following trigger strategy:
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a) In t = 1, play hawk or dove so that n
′
H hawks are in the network and
ensure that the links are link balanced.4
b) In t ∈ {2, ..., t∗} keep playing your strategy as in (a) if no player devi-
ated. Otherwise, play the hawk strategy and remove all links.
c) In t ∈ {t∗, ..., T} play the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game yield-
ing the highest overall payoff; i.e., the Nash equilibrium, with the mini-
mum number of hawks n∗H , if no player deviated from the desired strat-
egy in t ≤ t∗. Otherwise, play the hawk strategy and remove all links.
Example 4. Applied to our running example, the efficient number of hawks
n
′
H equals 0.5 =
1
2
(6− 60−0.5·50
80+40−60−0.5·50(6− 1)) = 12(n− b−0.5ka+c−b−0.5k (n− 1)). As
per period only an integer number of hawks is possible, efficiency is reached
with either n
′
H = 0 or n
′
H = 1. In the remainder of this example, we focus
on the latter. Hence, 1 player will resort to hawk and 5 players will resort
to dove in the first period. The minimum number of hawks n∗H has to satisfy
n∗H ≥ 2.5 = 80−6080−60+40−20(6−1) = a−ba−b+c−d(n−1). Again, only integer numbers
of hawks can be part of the network n∗H = 3 holds. Hence, players resort to
the efficient strategy profile for periods t ∈ {1, ..., t∗} with t∗ ≤ T − 1 =
T − 1·(20−40)+(6−1−1)·(80−60)
min{3·40+(6−3−1)(60−50);(6−3−1)(80−50)} .
As such, they only resort to the Nash equilibrium with n∗H = 3 in the last
period.
4.2. Repeated play with fixed actions
One disadvantage of the equilibrium reached when playing a trigger strat-
egy is that a Nash equilibrium has to be played for the last period, resulting
in an efficiency loss. In addition, our analysis of the Network Hawk-Dove
game with a focus on action and links indicated that efficiency and equilibria
are in line if only links can be chosen. Hence, we investigate whether limiting
the set of actions / links after an initial period without any limitations can
overcome the efficiency loss.
When limiting the set of actions, the intuition is as follows. During the
periods with fixed actions, it is myopically best to establish the links to all
4Notice that finding a corresponding strategy profile is a coordination problem. How-
ever, we do not discuss how to find this strategy profile. Deviations can be punished,
since, after observing the strategies in the previous period, all players know whether it
was found or not.
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other players who do not resort to the hawk strategy (see the definition of link
balance). The corresponding equilibrium is also efficient. The payoff during
the periods with fixed actions is higher if, initially, an efficient strategy profile
was played than when the players resorted to a Nash equilibrium. Hence,
the longer the actions are fixed, the more beneficial it is to play the efficient
strategy profile in t = 1.
Theorem 8 (Finitely repeated equilibrium with fixed actions). By lim-
iting the strategy set to links only in t > 1, playing an efficient strategy profile
with n
′
H hawks in t = 1 and all subsequent periods {1, .., T} is a Nash equi-
librium, if
a) All links are link balanced.
b1) If T (a − b + c) ≥ (T − 1)k − d holds, the number of hawks n′H in the
population has to satisfy the condition
0 ≤ n′H ≤ T (a−b)T (a−b)+(T−1)cn.
b2) If T (a − b + c) < (T − 1)k − d holds, the number of hawks n′H in the
population has to satisfy the condition
T (a−b)−(T−1)k
T (a−b+c)−(T−1)k−d(n− 1) ≤ n
′
H ≤ T (a−b)T (a−b)+(T−1)cn.
Example 5. Applied to our running example with the efficient number of
hawks n
′
H = 1 condition, (a) and (b1) have to be fulfilled as T (a − b + c) =
T (80−60+40) ≥ (T−1)50−20 = (T−1)k−d holds. n′H ≤ T (80−60)T (80−60)+(T−1)406 =
T (a−b)
T (a−b)+(T−1)cn. The condition is always fulfilled for n
′
H = 1.
Hence, limiting the strategy set for at least one period results in playing
the efficient strategy profile of the one-shot Network Hawk-Dove game for all
T periods.
4.3. Repeated play with fixed links
Let us now focus on the impact of limiting the strategy space to choosing
actions after the first period. As the description of action efficiency and ac-
tion balance has already demonstrated, limiting the strategy set to choosing
actions can result in a discrepancy between equilibrium and efficiency. This
result is confirmed by applying a trigger strategy to the resulting game. As
we show, limiting the strategy set to actions only ensures that, even by rep-
etition, no additional equilibria are found, except for those in the one-shot
Network Hawk-Dove game.
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Theorem 9 (Finitely repeated equilibrium with fixed links). By fix-
ing actions after the first period (t = 1), applying a trigger strategy yields no
additional sub-game perfect equilibria, with the exception of those played in
the one-shot version of the Network Hawk-Dove game.
5. Hypotheses
The one-shot Network Hawk-Dove game results in a potential social
dilemma. This social dilemma is linked to the final payoffs in the game.
From an efficiency-focused perspective, it is best for many players to resort
to dove (see Theorem 5). The more doves that are in the network, the higher
the overall payoff. From an myopically payoff-maximizing perspective, how-
ever, it is best for the players to resort to the hawk action (see Theorem 6).
As long as all others keep playing their strategy, this increases their individual
payoffs.
Finitely repeating the Network Hawk-Dove game (see Theorem 7) can
resolve this issue. That is, by simply repeating the Network Hawk-Dove
game, strategy profiles with higher numbers of doves are sub-game perfect.
Hypothesis 1 (Efficiency). Strategy profiles in the finitely repeated ver-
sion of the Network Hawk-Dove game are more efficient than those in the
one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Whether efficiency is sub-game perfect or not depends on the specific
design of the repetition. If the played actions are fixed after the initial period,
efficient outcomes still occur (see Theorem 8). However, efficiency does not
occur if links are fixed (see Theorem 9). Hence, we expect similar payoffs in
the finitely repeated Network Hawk-Dove game as well as the repeated game
with fixed actions. However, payoffs should be lower if links are fixed.
Hypothesis 2 (Fixed Links). Efficiency in a game with fixed links is lower
(a) than in a treatment with neither links nor actions fixed and
(b) than in a treatment with only actions fixed.
5.1. Experimental design
To evaluate the hypotheses described, we conducted a laboratory exper-
iment at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Each experimental session
lasted approximately 1.5 hours. For all sessions, we recruited a total of 162
15
subjects using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) from a pool of students in Karlsruhe.
At the beginning of each experimental session, we randomly split the sub-
jects into groups of six. Each subject was given a set of written instructions
that described the experimental setup. After all subjects had read the in-
structions, they played one treatment at a computer terminal, using zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Finally, we paid the subjects in private in accordance
with their success during the treatment.
The baseline treatment (Treatment Basic) is equivalent to the Network
Hawk-Dove game and consisted of 50 periods. In every period, subjects
could specify which subjects they wanted to establish links to and the action
they wanted to play. At the end of each period, the experimental software
calculated subjects’ payoff (with the payoff function being identical to our
running example in Table 2). For each link a subject established, he had to
pay k = 50 points. All linked subjects then played the Hawk-Dove game.
That is to say, if a subject played dove and his neighbor hawk, he received 40
points, while his neighbor received 80 points. If both subjects played hawk,
they received 20 points each. They received 80 points when they coordinated
in the dove action. After the calculation of the payoff, the computer terminal
displayed the actions, links, and individual performance of each subject.
We conducted two modifications of Treatment Basic: (1) Treatment Fixed
Link and (2) Treatment Fixed Action. Treatment Fixed Link was identical
to 10 times playing the Network Hawk-Dove game, before fixing the links
for four periods. In the Treatment Fixed Action, we fixed the actions for
four periods after playing the one-shot Network Hawk-Dove game. That is
to say, in both modifications, we limited the strategy sets of the subjects in
periods 2, ..., 5, 7, ..., 10 and allowed them to choose both, actions and links,
in periods 1, 6, .... Each subject participated in one treatment only. Hence,
54 subjects participated in 9 groups per treatment.
Notice that in our formal analysis of the modifications, we only analyzed
the Network Hawk-Dove game and the subsequent four periods. However,
we repeated all modifications 10 times. Hence, in both Treatment Fixed Link
and Treatment Fixed Action, subjects interacted for 50 periods. This design
allowed us to identify whether the efficiency was the result of the specific
design and not just the result of different adaptation speeds towards the
efficient outcome in the three treatments.
All subjects received a show-up fee of 5.00 Euro. For 1, 000 points earned
during the experiment, a subject received 1.00 Euro. On average, each sub-
ject earned 11.39 Euro.
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6. Experimental results
The remainder of this section presents an investigation of our two hy-
potheses. We first compare the outcomes in Treatment Basic to the Nash
equilibrium of the one-shot version of the game, before we analyze differences
in a treatment with fixed link (Treatment Fixed Link) to treatments with
variable links (Treatments Basic and Fixed Action).
6.1. Hypothesis Efficiency
Remember, according to Theorem 6, the number of hawks in the Nash
equlibrium of the one-shot game satisfies n∗H ≥ a−ba−b+c−d(n−1) = 80−6080−60+40−20(6−
1)) = 2.5. That is, if players resort to the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot
game, three or more hawks interact with three or less doves. The number of
links in a Nash equilibrium is maximal if the number of doves is maximal, as
all players only link to doves in Nash equilibrium. Hence, in a corresponding
network, the maximum number of links is 12 (= 3 · 3 [links from three hawks
to three doves] +3 [links between three doves]). As the payoff also increases
in the number of doves, the maximum payoff per hawk is 90 (= 3 ·80−3 ·50)
and it is, on average, per dove 190 (= 3 · 40 + 2 · 60 − 1 · 50). Hence, the
payoff of the group in the one-shot equilibrium is 840 (= 3 · 90 + 3 · 190).
We find that the overall average number of hawks in Treatment Basic
significantly lies below the number of hawks predicted by the one-shot Nash
equilibrium (signed rank test, two-sided, p = 0.039). However, the number
of links does not significantly differ from the prediction (signed rank test,
two-sided, p = 0.180) and, as a consequence, the payoffs are significantly
lower than the maximum payoff achievable in a Nash equilibrium (signed
rank test, two-sided, p = 0.004).
As Figure 3 (a) suggests, both the number of hawks (generalized mixed
model, fixed effects, p = 0.364) and the number of links (generalized mixed
model, fixed effects, p = 0.203), do not increase over time. The payoff signif-
icantly increases the longer the experiment lasts (generalized mixed model,
fixed effects, p = 0.000). To understand why the payoff increases, despite
the fact that neither the number of links or the number of hawks change, we
take a closer look at the links established (see Figure 3 (b)). The number of
missing links, i.e. unestablished links between doves or from hawks to doves,
significantly decreases over time (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p
= 0.002). Similarly, the number of bad links, i.e. established links between
hawks or redundant links, decreases as the periods commence (generalized
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Figure 3: Behavior in Treatment Basic
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mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.003). In other words, the behavior of the
subjects converges towards the sub-game perfect equilibrium over time. From
period 25 on, less than 6 links per group are either bad or missing. That is,
from period 25 onwards, each subject makes only one (or less) link error per
period.
Hence, we observe that, from the initial period onwards, the number
of hawks in Treatment Basic is lower than those predicted by the one-shot
Nash equilibrium. Although the number of links and, as a consequence the
payoffs, do not exceed the number of links and payoffs predicted by the one-
shot Nash equilibrium, both figures increase over time. Hence, the subjects
learn and play the efficient Nash equilibria of the repeated game, thus clearly
confirming Hypothesis Efficiency.
6.2. Hypothesis Fixed Links
We now compare the outcome of Treatment Fixed Links to the other two
treatments with respect to efficiency (Hypothesis Fixed Links). In Treat-
ment Fixed Links, the number of hawks does not significantly differ from the
minimum number of hawks in the Nash equilibrium (n∗H = 2.5, Wilcoxon
test, two-sided, p = 0.944). Similar to Treatment Basic, the number of links
(signed rank test, two-sided, p = 0.004) and the payoffs (signed rank test,
two-sided, p = 0.004) are significantly lower than in the payoff maximal one-
shot Nash equilibrium. These results indicate that fixing the links after an
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initial period leads to lower payoffs than a game in which subjects can choose
their links during every period.
As expected, the number of hawks in Treatment Fixed Links lies below
the number of hawks in Treatment Basic (Mann Whitney U test, one-sided,
p=0.032). In addition, the number of links (Mann Whitney U test, one-sided,
p=0.039) as well as the payoff (Mann Whitney U test, one-sided, p=0.002)
is lower in Treatment Fixed Links than in Treatment Basic.
To ensure that the differences are not only the consequence of the subjects
learning the equilibria slower in Treatment Fixed Links than in Treatment
Basic, we analyze the behavior of the subjects during the ten repetitions (see
Figure 4). As we already observed in Treatment Basic, neither the number of
hawks (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.069) or the number of
links (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.998) changes significantly.
That is, we can confirm that subjects do not learn the efficient behavior over
time, but keep playing the Nash equilibria initially chosen. Nevertheless, the
subjects do optimize their behavior. Namely, payoffs increase throughout the
game (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.010) due to the subjects
optimizing the quality of their links. Over time, both the number of missing
links (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.013) and the number of
wrong links (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.011) decreases.
Figure 4: Behavior in Treatment Fixed Links
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From the start of Treatment Fixed Links, we observe the number of hawks
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does not differ from the number of hawks in the one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Although the subjects keep improving their links throughout the game, they
never reach the levels of efficiency we observed in Treatment Basic, confirming
Hypothesis Fixed Links (a).
Let us finally turn our focus to Treatment Fixed Action. Here, results are
comparable to the results observed during Treatment Basic. Significantly less
hawks participate per group than predicted in the one-shot Nash equilibrium
(signed rank test, two-sided, p = 0.039). However, fewer links (signed rank
test, two-sided, p = 0.004) and lower payoffs (signed rank test, two-sided,
p = 0.004) than expected in the payoff maximal one-shot Nash equilibrium
occur.
A comparison of Treatment Fixed Action with the Treatment Fixed Links
confirms Hypothesis Fixed Links (b): Payoffs in Treatment Fixed Action are
higher (Mann Whitney U test, one-sided, p=0.000) because the number of
hawks is lower (MannWhitney U test, one-sided, p=0.012). However, we find
no significant difference in the number of established links (Mann Whitney
U test, one-sided, p=0.081).
Figure 5: Behavior in Treatment Fixed Action
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A closer look at the temporal patterns of behavior can justify the low
number of links on average (see Figure 5). While payoffs increase (general-
ized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.000) and the number of hawks does
not change (generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.110), as observed
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in both other treatments, the number of links increases (generalized mixed
model, fixed effects, p = 0.002). In addition, the number of missing links
(generalized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.001) and the bad links (gen-
eralized mixed model, fixed effects, p = 0.001) decrease.
We argue that learning how to play the sub game perfect equilibrium
plays an even more important role in Treatment Fixed Action than in both
other treatments. Whenever the subjects can choose actions and links simul-
taneously, they focus on choosing the correct action. It is only during the
subsequent periods that they establish their links, ensuring that the num-
ber of wrong links is low throughout play. Let us now focus on the periods
of Treatment Fixed Action in which actions are fixed. Here, subjects in
Treatment Fixed Action adapt their links faster than in Treatment Basic.
The number of links between hawks (Mann Whitney U, two-sided p=0.000)
and the number of links from hawks to doves (Mann Whitney U, two-sided,
p=0.014) is lower in Treatment Fixed Action than in Treatment Basic. Bilat-
eral, i.e., inefficient, links between two hawks (Mann Whitney U, two-sided,
p=0.006) as well as missing links from hawks to doves (Mann Whitney U,
two-sided, p=0.000) are also less frequent in Treatment Fixed Action. Even
links from doves to hawks do not occur as often (Mann Whitney U, two-sided,
p=0.001).
7. Conclusion
This paper extended existing game-theoretic analyses of the one-shot Net-
work Hawk-Dove game (Bramoulle´ et al., 2004; Berninghaus and Vogt, 2006;
Schosser et al., 2012) to the finitely repeated version of the game. We showed
that, although efficient strategy profiles and Nash equilibria of the one-shot
game differ, efficient strategy profiles represent sub-game perfect equilibria
in the finitely repeated version of the game. Our results are especially worth-
while because a small design change, i.e., limiting the strategy set to action
selection in some periods, resulted in the inability of our game-theoretic to
predict efficiency and the subjects failing to reach significantly lower payoffs
in the lab.
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Appendix A. Formal analysis
Given the definition of the Network Hawk-Dove game (see Section 2), the
cost per link k can be any real number. However, we limit our analysis in
the remainder to (1) k ≥ 2d, (2) a > b > k > c > d, (3) 2c > k and
(4) n ≥ 3. (1) k > 2d follows the standard interpretation of Hawk-Dove
games, where d represents injuries from aggressive behavior and typically
is 0 (Neugebauer et al., 2008) or negative (Smith and Price, 1973). Hence,
linking two hawks is not beneficial, even if both alternate in paying for the
link. If a > b > k > c > d holds (2), links from hawks to doves pay, while
they do not pay between hawks, and links from doves to hawks do not pay,
while they pay between doves, offering all players a variety of link decisions.
This changes for all other parameter combinations: If k > a, no links are
established. If a > k > b, only links from hawks to doves pay and each
hawk will link to all doves. If c > k > d, only links between hawks do not
pay. Hence, doves benefit from links to all others, turning their link decision
trivial again. Due to our first restriction, d > k cannot hold. (3) Next, we
set 2c > k. This is basically a simplification which ensures that for doves,
who alternate in establishing their links, the link pays. (4) We assume that
more than 2 players, i.e., n ≥ 3, participate in our Network Hawk-Dove game
to investigate real networks and not only Hawk-Dove games with an outside
option.
Before describing the proofs of the paper in more detail, we first intro-
duce the definition for Nash equilibria and efficiency in Network Hawk-Dove
games. We use both definitions in the letter to characterize efficient strategy
profiles and Nash equilibria in the Network Hawk-Dove game.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). Each strategy profile s∗ = (σN
∗
, σB
∗
)
in Γ is a Nash equilibrium if
∀i : Pi(s∗−i, s∗i ) ≥ Pi(s∗−i, si) for si ∈ Si.
Definition 2 (Efficiency). Each strategy profile s
′
= (σN
′
, σB
′
) in Γ is
efficient if
∀ s 	= s′ :
∑
∀i
Pi(s
′
−i, s
′
i) ≥
∑
∀j
Pj(s−j, sj) for s ∈ S.
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A.1. Social dilemmas in one-shot Network Hawk-Dove games
The remainder of this and the subsequent sections follows the structure of the
main paper. In this section, we characterize efficiency strategy profiles and
Nash equilibria of the one-shot Network Hawk-Dove game using Definitions 1
and 2. We do so by first focusing on links and actions in isolation, before we
discuss implications for the integrated game.
A.1.1. Link centric game
Theorem 1. A strategy profile is efficient with respect to links, link efficient,
if all links are unilateral and with the exception of links between hawks all
links are established.
Proof 1. The theorem is equivalent to the following three conditions: (a) all
links are unilateral, (b) all hawks are linked to all doves but not to any hawks,
and (c) all doves are linked to all other doves. Condition (a) is a consequence
of the game design. Players benefit from all other players they are linked to.
Redundant links do not increase payoff. Conditions (b) and (c) follow from
a > b > k and k > 2d.
Theorem 2. A strategy profile is in equilibrium with respect to links, link
balanced, if all links are link efficient and doves only pay for links to other
doves.
Proof 2. The theorem is equivalent to the following three conditions: (a) all
links are unilateral, (b) all hawks establish links to all doves but not to any
hawks, and (c) all doves establish links to every other dove. Condition (a)
and its proof are equivalent to Condition (a) of Theorem 1. Conditions (b)
and (c) follow directly from a > b > k > c > d.
A.1.2. Action centric game
Theorem 3. A strategy profile with at least one link is efficient with respect
to actions, action efficient, if the number of hawks n
′
H lies below a certain
upper bound. For certain networks structures no upper bound for the number
of doves exists.
Proof 3. The payoff of a hawk is Pi(s−i, {σBi = H; σNi }) := d · niH(s) + a ·
niD(s), while it is Pi(s−i, {σBi = D; σNi }) := c · niH(s) + b · niD(s) for a dove.
For both types of players the payoffs increase the more doves they have in
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their neighborhood as niH(s) = n
i(s) − niD(s) and a > b > c > d. As a > b
network structures can exist in which the some hawks are beneficial for the
whole population. However, as doves lose part of their payoff (b − c), if a
neighbor switches to the hawk strategy network structures can exist in which
no hawk exist in efficient strategy profiles.
Theorem 4. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ (SB,ΣN) is in equilibrium with respect
to actions, action balanced, if the following statement holds: (a) Each player
i uses the hawk action if in his neighborhood the following condition holds
niH(s
∗) < a−b
a−b+c−d · ni(s∗), with niH(s∗) (ni(s∗)) being the number of hawks
(players) in her neighborhood. (b) Every player resorts to dove otherwise.
Proof 4. Conditions (a) and (b) follow from the payoff function P (·) of
the Network Hawk-Dove game. The payoff of the hawk action exceeds that
of the dove action if the following inequality holds: Pi(s
∗
−i, {H; σNi }) = d ·
niH(s) + a ·niD(s)− k |σNi | > c ·niH(s) + b ·niD(s)− k |σNi | = Pi(s∗−i, {D; σNi }).
With niH(s) = n
i(S) − niD(s), this inequality simplifies to the inequality of
condition (a). A player resorts to the dove action if the inequality does not
hold (condition (b)).
A.1.3. Integrated game
Theorem 5. In efficient strategy profiles of Network Hawk-Dove games, all
links are link efficient and the number of hawks n
′
H satisfies
n
′
H =
1
2
(n− b− 0.5k
a+ c− b− 0.5k (n− 1))
Proof 5. Let nH be the number of hawks and nD = n − nH the number of
doves in the network. In link efficient strategy profiles, the aggregated payoff
of all players is
P (·) = nH · (n− nH) · (a+ c− k) + 0.5(n− nH) · (n− nH − 1) · (2b− k)
with nH ·(n−nH) being the number of links between hawks and doves yielding
a+c−k per link and 0.5(n−nH)·(n−nH−1) being the number of links between
doves yielding 2b−k. To identify the maximum of P (·), we differentiate P (·)
twice:5
∂P (·)/∂nH = (n− 2nH) · (a+ c− k) + (2nH − 2n+ 1) · (b− 0.5k)
5Notice that our analysis is a simplification as we search the optimum of P (·) under
the condition that 0 ≤ nh ≤ n. However, we ignore this condition when differentiating
and manually check for the borders of the condition later.
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and
∂2P (·)/∂n2H = −2(a+ c− b− 0.5k).
The optimum lies at ∂P (·)/∂nH = 0 being equivalent to n′H = 12(n− b−0.5ka+c−b−0.5k ·
(n−1)). As we assume that 2c > k and a > b (see preconditions of the game),
a+c−b−0.5k is always positive and therefore, ∂2P (·)/∂n2H < 0 holds. Hence,
the optimum is a maximum.
Theorem 6. In Nash equilibria of Network Hawk-Dove games, all links are
link balanced and the number of hawks n∗H satisfies
n∗H ≥
a− b
a− b+ c− d(n− 1) > 0.
Proof 6. In link balanced strategy profiles, unilateral deviation from hawk
to dove is beneficial if the following inequality holds: Pi(s
∗
−i, {H; σN∗i }) =
n∗Da − k|σN∗i | < n∗Db − k|σN∗i | = Pi(s∗−i, {D; σN∗i }). This inequality is al-
ways false as a > b holds. Each dove player deviates from dove to hawk if
Pi(s
∗
−i, {D; σN∗i }) = n∗Hc+ (n∗D − 1)b− k|σN∗i | < n∗Hd+ (n∗D − 1)a− k|σN∗i | =
Pi(s
∗
−i, {H; σN∗i }) holds. This inequality is false if the inequality of the theo-
rem is met.
Notice, Definition 1, Theorem 6, and the corresponding proof follow the
ideas introduced by Berninghaus and Vogt (2006) and are repeated here
to simplify understanding of subsequent proofs. Although the arguments in
these proofs differ from Bramoulle´ et al. (2004), the predictions of Theorem 6
are equivalent to their results.
In addition to the theorems above, we will rely on one additional lemma
in the remainder, describing the properties of the payoff minimal Nash equi-
librium in a Network Hawk-Dove game:
Lemma 1. The Nash equilibrium of the Network Hawk-Dove game, yielding
the lowest payoff for all players, is characterized by only hawk players (nH =
n) and no links.
Proof 7. According to Theorem 6, the described strategy is a Nash equilib-
rium as all links are link balanced and n = n∗H ≥ n − 1 ≥ a−ba−b+c−d(n − 1)
holds if c > d, which is a property of the Hawk-Dove game. As no links exist,
the payoff in this equilibrium is 0. Any other Nash equilibrium yields higher
payoffs for at least two players and no lower payoffs for any of the players
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since in all other Nash equilibria at least one player resorts to dove and at
least one link from another player to this dove exists, yielding positive payoffs
for both players, given the links are link balanced.
A.2. Impact of finite repetition on social dilemmas
We now investigate the impact of repetition on the played equilibria. We
first investigate the game where in each period t ∈ {1, ..., T} all players play
the one-shot version of the Network Hawk-Dove game, before we limit the
strategy set in t > 1 to links and actions only. Before discussing all proof,
we first introduce another lemma, we will resort to in the remainder.
Lemma 2. Playing a Nash equilibrium of the Network Hawk-Dove game in
period t = 1 and all subsequent periods is a Nash equilibrium of the T times
repeated game.
Proof 8. The proof is obvious. The Nash equilibrium of the one-shot Net-
work Hawk-Dove game in period t = 1 is a Nash equilibrium in all subsequent
stage games. Hence, an equilibrium can exist in which every period the Nash
equilibrium of the one-shot game is played.
A.2.1. Repeated Network Hawk-Dove game
Definition 3 (Trigger strategy for the Network Hawk-Dove game).
Let the trigger strategy in the Network Hawk-Dove game be as follows:
a) In t = 1 play hawk or dove so that nH hawks are in the network and
ensure that the links are link balanced.
b) In t ∈ {2, ..., t∗} keep playing your strategy as in (a) if no player devi-
ated. Otherwise, play the hawk strategy and remove all links.
c) In t ∈ {t∗, ..., T} play the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game yield-
ing the highest overall payoff with n∗H hawks if no player deviated from
the desired strategy in t ≤ t∗. Otherwise, play the hawk strategy and
remove all links.
Theorem 7. To reach Nash equilibria consisting of efficient strategy profiles,
the stage game in the T -period repeated Network Hawk-Dove game Γ, the
trigger strategy for the Network Hawk-Dove game (Definition 3) has to be
parameterized as follows:
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a) nH = n
′
H
b) n∗H > n
′
H and n
∗
H is the minimum number of hawks in a Nash equilib-
rium
c) t∗ ≤ T − n
′
H ·(d−c)+(n−n
′
H−1)·(a−b)
min{n∗H ·c+(n−n∗H−1)(b−k);(n−n∗H−1)(a−k)} .
Proof 9. Condition (a) follows directly from the observation that the de-
sired strategy profiles are non Nash equilibria of the stage game. Condition
(b) characterizes the equilibrium played in periods t∗+1, ..., T if no player de-
viated. In the equilibrium, all links are link balanced and the number of hawks
is chosen such that the highest overall payoff for all players is reached. We
assume that the efficient strategy profile is no Nash equilibrium (otherwise
no trigger strategy would be needed to reach an equilibrium; see Lemma 2).
Therefore n
′
H < n
∗
H holds. The Nash equilibrium with the highest overall
payoff is characterized by n∗H being the lowest possible number of hawks as
the payoff in the one-shot game is monotonically decreasing if the number of
hawks increases (see the proof of Theorem 5). Condition (c) characterizes the
number of periods to resort to the payoff maximal equilibrium. If one player
deviated in t ≤ t∗, the payoff of all players is 0 in all subsequent periods.
Therefore each player not deviating earns a minimum of
min{n∗H · c+ (n− n∗H − 1)(b− k); (n− n∗H − 1)(a− k)}
for each of the T − t∗ last periods. For this payoff we expect that all links
are link balanced (which they are in equilibrium). Further, the left argument
(n∗H · c+(n−n∗H −1)(b−k)) is the minimal payoff for resorting to dove, i.e.,
the payoff if paying for all links, and the right argument ((n−n∗H−1)(a−k))
is the payoff for resorting to hawk. The gain for not deviating has to be at
least as high as the gain from deviating in t = t∗. A player being a hawk in
t∗ will not deviate as, given the links are link balanced, she is linked to doves
only, and switching from hawk to dove will reduce her payoff. A dove, on the
other hand, might switch to hawk in t∗ to increase her payoff by
n
′
H · (d− c) + (n− n
′
H − 1) · (a− b).
For the trigger strategy to reach an equilibrium (T − t∗) · min{n∗H · c +
(n−n∗H −1)(b−k); (n−n∗H −1)(a−k)} ≥ n′H · (d− c)+(n−n′H −1) · (a− b)
has to hold, which simplifies to condition (c).
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A.2.2. Repeated play with fixed actions
Theorem 8. By limiting the strategy set to links only in t > 1 playing an
efficient strategy profile with n
′
H hawks in t = 1 and all subsequent periods
{1, .., T} is a Nash equilibrium, if
a) All links are link balanced.
b1) If T (a − b + c) ≥ (T − 1)k − d holds, the number of hawks n′H in the
population has to satisfy the condition
0 ≤ n′H ≤
T (a− b)
T (a− b) + (T − 1)cn.
b2) If T (a − b + c) < (T − 1)k − d holds, the number of hawks n′H in the
population has to satisfy the condition
T (a− b)− (T − 1)k
T (a− b+ c)− (T − 1)k − d(n− 1) ≤ n
′
H ≤
T (a− b)
T (a− b) + (T − 1)cn.
Proof 10. Condition (a) follows directly from the conditions for link balance
(see Theorem 2). Condition (b1) follows from the gain a player, who is hawk
in t = 1, receives by switching to dove in t = 1. Her payoff is T (n−n′H)(a−k)
for playing hawk. Switching to dove yields T (n− n′H)(b− k) + (T − 1)n′H · c
because she will still link to all doves, but in periods t ∈ {2, .., n} all hawks
will link to her to be in equilibrium. Playing hawk pays if
T (n− n′H)(a− k) > T (n− n
′
H)(b− k) + (T − 1)n
′
H · c,
which simplifies to n
′
H <
T ·(a−b)
T ·(a−b+c)−cn, condition (b1). Condition (b2) follows
from the gain a player, who is dove in t = 1, makes by switching to hawk in
t = 1. As dove, she receives (n
′
H · c+ (n−n′H − 1)b)T −
∑T
t=1 |σNi,t| · k. When
deviating to hawk in t = 1, she receives n
′
H · d + (n− n′H − 1)a− |σNi,1| · k +
(T − 1)(n− n′H − 1)(a− k). Simplified, the payoff for a dove exceeds that for
deviating to hawk if
n
′
H · (T (a−b+c)− (T −1)k−d) < (n−1) · (T (a−b)− (T −1)k)+k
T∑
t=2
|σNi,t|.
This inequality corresponds to two conditions: (1) If T (a−b+c)−(T −1)k−
d < 0, n
′
H > ((n−1)(T (a−b)−(T −1)k)+k
∑T
t=2 |σNi,t|)/(T (a−b+c)−(T −
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1)k−d) has to hold, which is always fulfilled as k∑Tt=2 |σNi,t| ≤ k(T−1)(n−1)
and n
′
H ≥ 0 and corresponds to (b1). (2) If T (a− b+ c)− (T − 1)k− d > 0,
n
′
H < ((n−1)(T (a−b)−(T−1)k)+k
∑T
t=2 |σNi,t|)/(T (a−b+c)−(T−1)k−d).
Here the right-hand side of the inequality is minimal if k
∑T
t=2 |σNi,t| = 0.
This corresponds to condition (b2). The network is in equilibrium in periods
2 to T , while all conditions described here ensure that the overall game is in
equilibrium. Hence, the described equilibrium is also sub game perfect.
A.2.3. Repeated play with fixed links
Lemma 3. Every link efficient strategy profile (σB, σN) of the Network Hawk-
Dove game Γ which is no Nash equilibrium implies two Nash equilibria (sB, σN)
in a game with fixed links ΓN :
a) For all i with σBi = H, s
B
i = H and
nH + δH − 1 < a− b
a− b+ c− d · (n− 1) < nH + δH
holds, or
b) For all i with σBi = H, s
B
i = D and
δH − 1 < a− b
a− b+ c− d · (n− 1) < δH
holds,
with nH being the number of players with σ
B
i = H and δH being the number
of players with σBj = D, s
B
j = H.
Proof 11. For all link efficient strategy profiles which are no Nash equilibria
in Γ nH <
a−b
a−b+c−d(n − 1) holds (see Theorem 6). All nH players i with
σBi = H have identical contacts as they are linked to all doves and no hawks.
Hence, they all resort to the same action sBi . All nD = n− nH other players
either resort to sBj = H or s
B
k = D. Condition (a) analyzes the case of
sBi = H. Whether an equilibrium is reached, depends on the fraction of
players j with sBj = H and σ
B
j = D to players k with s
B
k = D and σ
B
k = D.
Let the number of players i be nH , the number of players j be δH , and the
number of players k be nD−δH with n = nH+nD. In the neighborhood of each
player i niH(s) <
a−b
a−b+c−d ·ni(s) has to hold for player i to resort to hawk (see
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Theorem 4). For players i this is equivalent to δH <
a−b
a−b+c−d · (δH +nD− δH)
as they are linked to players j and k only. All players j and k are linked to
all players in the network. Hence, for them nH + δH − 1 < a−ba−b+c−d · (n− 1)
and nH + δH >
a−b
a−b+c−d · (n− 1), respectively, have to be fulfilled. The three
inequalities are equivalent to
δH <
a− b
a− b+ c− d · (n− nH) (A.1)
and
nH + δH − 1 < a− b
a− b+ c− d · (n− 1) < nH + δH . (A.2)
Inequality (1) is fulfilled if the left inequality of (2) is fulfilled. Condition (b)
focuses on all nH players i resorting to s
B
i = D. Let the number of players
j be δH with s
B
j = H and the number of players k be nD − δH with sBk = D.
In the corresponding neighborhoods, the following inequalities have to hold:
players i, δH >
a−b
a−b+c−d · (n− nH); players j, δH − 1 < a−ba−b+c−d · (n− 1), and
players k, δH >
a−b
a−b+c−d · (n− 1). The three inequalities are equivalent to
δH >
a− b
a− b+ c− d · (nD) (A.3)
and
δH − 1 < a− b
a− b+ c− d · (n− 1) < δH . (A.4)
Inequality (3) is contained in the right-hand part of inequality (4) if nH ≥ 1,
which is fulfilled for all non Nash equilibria of the one-shot Network Hawk-
Dove game (see Theorem 6).
Definition 4. In a game limiting the strategy set to actions only in t > 1
and to the Network Hawk-Dove game in t = 1, let the trigger strategy be:
a) In t = 1 play hawk or dove so that nH hawks are in the network. If
you are a hawk, link to all doves; if you are a dove, ensure that you are
unilaterally linked to all other doves.
b) In t ∈ {2, ..., t∗} keep playing your strategy as in (a) if no player devi-
ated. Otherwise, play the equilibrium yielding the lowest payoff for the
deviating player.
33
c) In t ∈ {t∗, ..., T} keep playing your strategy if no player deviated from
playing the equilibrium of the one-shot game yielding the highest overall
payoff. Otherwise, play the equilibrium with the lowest payoff for the
deviating player.
Lemma 4. For a link efficient strategy profiles (σB, σN) in a Network Hawk-
Dove Γ which are no Nash equilibria, the following two observations hold:
a) Players with σB = H reach higher payoffs with sB = H if δH <
a−b
a−b+c−d(n− nH) and with sB = D otherwise.
b) Players with σB = D reach higher payoffs if sB = H than if sB = D.
Proof 12. Let nH players i be the players with σ
B = H, δH players j be the
players with σB = D, sB = H, and nD − δH players k be the players with
σB = D, sB = D.
Condition (a) follows from link balance (see Theorem 4). Condition (b)
follows from considering the payoffs of the players with σB = D. We consider
two cases: (1) all players i choose sB = H and (2) all players i choose
sB = D. In case (1), each player j earns (nH + δH − 1)d+ (nD − δH)a and
each player k earns (nH + δH)c+(nD− δH −1)b. Hence, for sB = H yielding
higher payoffs: (nH + δH − 1)d+ (nD − δH)a > (nH + δH)c+ (nD − δH − 1)b
has to hold. With nD = n− nH , this simplifies to
nH + δH − a− d
a− b+ c− d <
a− b
a− b+ c− d(n− 1). (A.5)
As a−d
a−b+c−d > 1, this inequality is fulfilled for all link efficient strategy profiles
that are no Nash equilbria (see Lemma 3, condition (a)). In case (2), the
condition to resort to hawk changes to (δH − 1)d + (nH + nD − δH)a >
(δH)c+ (nH + nD − δH − 1)b, which simplifies to
δH − a− d
a− b+ c− d <
a− b
a− b+ c− d(n− 1). (A.6)
As a−d
a−b+c−d > 1, this inequality is fulfilled for all link efficient strategy profiles
that are no Nash equilbria (see Lemma 3, condition (b)).
Theorem 9. By fixing actions after the first period (t = 1), applying a
trigger strategy yields no additional sub game perfect equilibria except for the
ones played in the one-shot version of the Network Hawk-Dove game.
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Proof 13. We now consider whether the trigger strategy can yield additional
equilibria in which more than nH =
a−b
a−b+c−d(n − 1) hawks persist. A dove
following the trigger strategy in the worst case earns t∗(nH · c + (n − nH −
1)b)+(T −t∗) ·((nH+δH) ·c+(n−(nH+δH)−1)b), with δH being the number
of additional hawks necessary to reach an equilibrium. Doves who switch to
hawk in periods t∗ to T earn more during these periods according to Lemma 4.
Let us assume the dove deviates to hawk in t∗ to ensure minimal punishment.
Now her payoff is (t∗ − 1)(nH · c+ (n− nH − 1)b) + nHd+ (n− nH − 1)a+
(T − t∗) · ((nH + δH) · c+ (n− (nH + δH)− 1)b). To establish an equilibrium,
t∗(nH ·c+(n−nH−1)b)+(T−t∗)·(nH ·c+(n−(nH+δH)−1)b) > (t∗−1)(nH ·c+
(n−nH−1)b)+nHd+(n−nH−1)a+(T−t∗)·((nH+δH)·c+(n−(nH+δH)−1)b)
has to hold. This simplifies to nH >
a−b
a−b+c−d(n − 1), which is equivalent to
condition (c) of Lemma 6, i.e., the Lemma describing the sub game perfect
equilibria in the Network Hawk-Dove Game. As doves are always connected
to all other players in the network, we can conclude that the Nash equilibria in
the Fixed Link Game are a subset of the equilibria in the Network Hawk-Dove
Game.
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